惩治腐败的定量化研究

如何通过惩治手段使腐败决策者理性地放弃腐败 ,是有现实意义的研究课题。本文分析了风险中立型的决策者的腐败决策过程 ,认为提高腐败查处概率和增加腐败遭惩罚所带来的损失 (以下简称腐败惩罚损失 ) ,可以有效地制约其腐败行为选择。当提高腐败查处概率到 0 .5以上时 ,高薪才能养廉 ,同样条件下 ,无论腐败租金金额多大 ,也会失去诱发腐败的效力。腐败惩罚损失的大小是根据腐败租金来设定的。当腐败租金增大时 ,加大腐败惩罚损失使之超过前者的增加速度 ,或在前者不变时提高后者 ,能够起到制约决策者腐败的作用。

Quantification Study on Corruption Punishment

How to make decision-maker reasonably give up corruption behavior by punishment measurement has practical significance. In this paper the corruption decision-making process of decision-makers as neutralism risk type is analyzed and it is concluded that heightening the probability of investigating and dealing with corruption and increasing the corruption punishment will effectively restrict the choice of corruption behaviors. The high salary can keep officials honest and clean only when the probability increases to 0 5. Under the same condition, however big is the rent of corruption, it will have no effect to induce corruption. The corruption loss will be set up by the rent of corruption,so corruption rent should be larger than the acceleration of the loss of the decision-maker for corruption punishment, or increasing the latter when the former is not changed can play an role of protecting decision-maker from making corruption.