Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case |
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Authors: | Eve Ramaekers |
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Institution: | 1. Chargé de Recherches du F.R.S.-FNRS, Université Catholique de Louvain, CORE, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
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Abstract: | One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods. |
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