Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency |
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| Authors: | Kazuhiko?Hashimoto mailto:kazu-hashimoto@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp" title=" kazu-hashimoto@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp" itemprop=" email" data-track=" click" data-track-action=" Email author" data-track-label=" " >Email author,Hiroki?Saitoh |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Graduate School of Economics,Kobe University,Kobe,Japan;2.Faculty of Economics,Kyoto Gakuen University,Kameoka,Japan |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance. |
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