政府利益约束下制度变迁机制分析

在制度变迁过程中, 政府既是公共利益的代表者, 又是独立的利益主体, 具有利益双重性的特点。基于政府在制度供给时会以公共利益最大化为目标, 但会受到政府利益为正的约束这一假定, 来讨论制度变迁的作用机制。结合中国改革进行实证检验, 得出经济含义与政策启示:只有打破旧制度带给政府的利益, 才会进行更有效率的新制度的供给和安排;不同领域内的体制间是相互依存互为约束和前提的, 要尽可能早地同时开始所有领域的变革, 使不同领域的体制协调性发展;推进中国当前的改革, 必须打破政府的自身利益;打破政府的自身利益必须推进行政体制改革。

Mechanism of Institutional Transformation under the Constraints of Government Interests

In the process of institutional transformation, the government is not only representative of public interest but also is an independent interest subject which features duality of interest. It is assumed that the government aims at maximizing the public interest when providing the system, it can be bound by government interest. Thus the paper discusses the mechanism of institutional transformation and draws a conclusion on the economic meaning and implication: only through breaking the government interest of the old system bring will a new and more efficient system be provided. The realistic or more optimal approach is to push the reforms in all areas at the same time by similar“steps”while considering coordination among various institutions. For the promotion of China’s current reform, the government’s own interests must be broken. In order to do that, political reforms must be promoted.