首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

“黄牛党”行为的经济学分析 “黄牛党”行为的经济学分析 “黄牛党”行为的经济学分析
作者姓名:Wang  Zhi-yong  &  Wang  Man
作者单位:1. 住房和城乡建设部干部学院,培训部,北京,100029
2. 北京工商大学,商学院,北京,100037
基金项目:首都流通业研究基地课题
摘    要:黄牛党的行为是市场经济活动中的一种投机行为,黄牛党行为的目标是利益最大化。商场黄牛党通过满足消费者的变现等方面的需求来获取利益。消费者基于消费效用最大化的目标实施消费行为,面对商场繁杂的促销形式会依据机会成本、边际效用递减规律等原理选择与黄牛党进行交易。

关 键 词:黄牛党  经济人  价格歧视  边际效用递减  机会成本
收稿时间:2008/3/2 0:00:00

Economic Analysis of "Scalpers" Behaviors
Wang Zhi-yong & Wang Man.Economic Analysis of "Scalpers" Behaviors[J].Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University:Social Science,2008,23(4):21-24.
Authors:Wang Zhi-yong & Wang Man
Institution:Wang Zhi-yong1 & Wang Man2 (1. Cadre Institute,Ministry of Housing , Urban-Rural Development of P.R.C.,Beijing 100029,China,2. Business School,Beijing Technology , Business University,Beijing 100037,China)
Abstract:Scalping is a kind of speculative behavior among the activities under market economy, the aim of which is to maximize the benefit. Scalpers gain their profits by satisfying the consumers' demand for real cash. Consumers carry out their consumption activities under the law of maximizing the utilities of consumption. Confronted with the complicated forms of sales promotions conducted by sellers, consumers will trade with scalpers under the rules of opportunity cost, diminishing marginal utility and other theo...
Keywords:Scalpers  consumers  price discrimination  diminishing marginal utility  opportunity cost  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号