| 政府采购招标与拍卖的博弈论模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 周蓉. 政府采购招标与拍卖的博弈论模型研究[J]. 复旦学报(社会科学版), 2002, 28(2): 92-95 |
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| 作者姓名： | 周蓉 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学,管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 复旦大学管理学院青年科学技术基金资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章主要研究关于国际范围内政府采购招标与拍卖的几个典型的博弈论模型 ,包括McAfee和McMillan模型、Branco模型、Naegelen和Mougeout模型 ,并对他们进行了简短的评述。同时也论述了中国加入WTO后 ,如何制定一个适当的优惠政策和最优招标与拍卖机制 ,使得政府和国内企业均可获利。
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| 关 键 词： | 次高价格 招标与拍卖 最高价格招标与拍卖 最优机制 优惠政策 |
| 文章编号： | 0257-0289(2002)02-093-004 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001-11-25 |
Several Game Theoretical Models of Government Procurement Auction |
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| Zhou Rong. Several Game Theoretical Models of Government Procurement Auction[J]. Fudan Journal(Social Sciences Edition), 2002, 28(2): 92-95 |
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| Authors: | Zhou Rong |
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| Abstract: | This paper surveys several main models of government procurement auction including models of McAfee & McMillan, Branco and Naegelen & Mougeout. These models are commented on briefly in this paper. It also discusses how to decide a preference and an optimal auction mechanism so that the government and domestic firms are all in a win win situation after China enters WTO. |
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| Keywords: | second price auction first price auction optimal mechanism preference |
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