中国官员升迁激励与选择的互动机制研究

首先提出“优胜不劣汰”的晋升锦标赛模型，研究发现升迁欲望与同级官员数量增加能够提高官员工作的积极性。不过，在考察上级官员对下级官员工作的觉察能力时发现，如果官员通过岗位职责内的工作难以达到其在晋升锦标赛中的最优结果时，那么官员将会选择做那些能够直接被上级官员觉察但是社会效益低下的工作，从而导致晋升锦标赛走入困境，社会重复建设问题以及腐败问题都是这一困境的具体表现形式。因此，晋升锦标赛只有在上级官员识才能力达到一定程度时才是有效的。只有真正树立了“任人唯贤”的社会风气才能走出晋升锦标赛可能造成的困境，实现官员升迁激励与选择良性互动机制。

On the Interaction Mechanism between Incentive and Selection in Chinese officials Promotion

This paper proposes a “select the superior while maintain the inferior” promotion tournament model , suggests that promotion desire and the number of officials? counterparts can improve officials? work enthusiasm. Inspecting the superiors? ability of recognizing their inferiors? work capacity, this paper finds out that if officials couldn?t reach their highest goal in promotion tournament by taking their own responsibilities, they would do some work with low social benefit but could be recognized directly by the supervisors, which makes the promotion tournament get into trouble. The repeated construction problems and corruption are the specific symbol of this dilemma. Therefore, only if the supervisor?s judgment capability approaches to a certain degree could promotion tournament be effective. The difficult position of promotion tournament could not be changed until a good social atmosphere was created in official?s appointment by abilities.