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一种基于产量决策的电力市场博弈模型
引用本文:闫庆友,朱明亮. 一种基于产量决策的电力市场博弈模型[J]. 华北电力大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 0(1): 41-44
作者姓名:闫庆友  朱明亮
作者单位:华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京,102206
摘    要:
本文建立了一种基于产量决策的电力市场竞价模型,分析了在完全信息静态博弈中,对于不同的市场容量会形成不同的博弈类型和结果,论证了在有差价合约的情况下,可以通过控制合约电量的手段米达到控制博弈结果的目的,给出了在一定条件下的动态博弈会产生与静态博弈不同的解的条件。

关 键 词:电力市场  博弈论  差价和约  动态博弈
文章编号:1008-2603(2006)01-0041-04
修稿时间:2005-11-02

A Game Model of Electric Power Market Based on Output Decision
YAN Qing-you,ZHU Min-liang. A Game Model of Electric Power Market Based on Output Decision[J]. Journal of North China Electric Power University(Social Sciences), 2006, 0(1): 41-44
Authors:YAN Qing-you  ZHU Min-liang
Abstract:
This paper intends to construct a pricing model for power maket based on output decision.On the analysis of complete information static game,the model can induce different types of game which have different results for different market capacity.With the existence of price-difference contract we may control the contract amount of electricity to attain the purpose of control the game's result.Thus under certain conditions,there will be different results in the dynamic game from in the static game.
Keywords:electric power market  game theory  CFD  dynamic game
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