The Economics of the Counter-Reformation: Incumbent-Firm Reaction to Market Entry |
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| Authors: | Robert B. Ekelund Jr. Robert F. Hebert Robert D. Tollison |
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| Affiliation: | Ekelund:;Lowder Eminent Scholar Emeritus, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, and Vernon F. Taylor Visiting Distinguished Professor (2003), Trinity University, San Antonio, TX. Phone 1–334–821–1404, Fax 334–821–5000, E-mail Hebert:;Russell Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies Emeritus, Auburn University, and Visiting Professor of Economics, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Lafayette, LA 70504. Phone 1–337–482–6665, Fax 1–337–482–6675, E-mail Tollison:;Professor of Economics and BB&T Senior Fellow, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634. Phone 1–864–656–0438, Fax 1–864–656–4532, E-mail |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
The Catholic Church reacted to the Protestant Reformation by taking on the defensive posture of an incumbent-firm monopoly fighting to survive in the face of new competition. Contemporary firms typically respond to rival entry by rewriting their corporate charter. So did the medieval Catholic Church. But the Council of Trent failed as a reorganization plan because to keep economic rents flowing as before, it left intact the distribution of powers and property rights among the governing body of pope and cardinals—thus demonstrating that entrenched economic interests are powerful inducements to behavior, even in spiritual institutions. |
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