| 委托-代理理论与经理股票期权制度 |
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| 引用本文： | 莫旋,杨广.委托-代理理论与经理股票期权制度[J].河北理工大学学报(社会科学版),2006,6(2):107-109. |
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| 作者姓名： | 莫旋 杨广 |
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| 作者单位： | 湘潭大学,湖南,湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托-代理理论是信息经济学的核心内容.首先对委托-代理理论作了一个概括性的介绍,并着重分析了委托-代理问题存在的根源.最后部分分析了如何利用激励性经理股票期权制度来解决现代企业中存在的委托-代理问题.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理关系 经理股票期权 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-2804(2006)02-0107-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年6月14日 |
Principal-agent Theory and Executive Stock Option System |
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| MO Xuan,YANG Guang.Principal-agent Theory and Executive Stock Option System[J].Journal of Hebei Polytechnic University(Social Science Edition),2006,6(2):107-109. |
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| Authors: | MO Xuan YANG Guang |
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| Abstract: | Principal - agent theory is the key content of information economy. This paper firstly has made the in-trouction of a generality for Principal - agent theory, analyzing the origin of the Principal - agent problem, and then analyzed how to use encouragement executive stock option system to solve Principal - agent problems existing in modem enterprises. We hope this work can offer beneficial help for the related research in the country. |
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| Keywords: | principal - agnt relation and entrepreneur stock option information asymmetrical adverse selection moral hazard |
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