在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下的供应链协调机制分析

根据报童模型和信息揭示原理建立了在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下生产商、销售商和系统的利润模型。通过对模型的优化得到两种电子佣金制度下的最优期权订购量。比较最优期权订购量和系统最优生产容量,分析了不同电子佣金制度及期权和单方支付契约类型下供应链协调特征。得到以下结论:对于具有单季节随机市场需求特征产品的期权和单方支付契约拍卖中,若生产商执行单方支付,系统不能被协调。若销售商执行单方支付,系统的协凋与电子佣金的制度有关;在赢得契约生产商支付电子佣金的制度下,最利于系统的协调和利润的分配。

Analysis of Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism in Online - Reserve - Auctioning a Contract with Option and Side Payment

On the basis of newsvendor model and information revelation theorem,the manufacturer,retailer and e-intermediary profit models have been set up in online-reverse-auctioning a contract with options and side payment.Model optimization gives the optimum option order quantities under two e-commission systems.By comparing the optimum option order quantity with the optimal production capacity,the characteristics of supply chain coordination under different contract types and e-commission system is analyzed.The conclusion is drawn up as follows:on auction of the contract with options and side payment where product has a single-period stochastic demand,the system will not be coordinated if the manufacturer gives the side payment.If the retailer gives the side payment,system coordination is related to e-commission system.That the winning manufacturer pays the e-commission is beneficial to system coordination and profit allocation.