| 委托一代理制度下的差异厂商的水平兼并研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王影慧,张世英.委托一代理制度下的差异厂商的水平兼并研究[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2):136-139. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王影慧 张世英 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文考虑到企业中的委托—代理关系和各产品间的差异性,通过求解一个产品产量竞争的两阶段博弈的子博弈精练Nash均衡,对外生企业兼并的获利性和企业兼并的外部效应进行了分析,同时对最优激励参数的特性进行了说明。本文力求在深化对企业兼并的理论认识的同时,也为企业兼并的实践提供一定的指导。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 水平兼并 差异产品 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2005)02-0136-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年6月16日 |
Study on the Differentiated Enterprises Horizontal Merger under Delegation |
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| WANG Ying-hui,ZHANG Shi-ying.Study on the Differentiated Enterprises Horizontal Merger under Delegation[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2005,19(2):136-139. |
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| Authors: | WANG Ying-hui ZHANG Shi-ying |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,considering delegation and differentiation between products,we establish a two stage game model.We analyze the profitability of exogenous mergers and exterior effects of mergers through a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of quantities.At the same time,we also illustrate the characters of premium incentive parameter.It aims to deepen the knowledge of merger theory and provide guide to merger practice to some extent. |
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| Keywords: | delegation horizontal merger differentiated products game |
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