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Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules |
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| Authors: | Stephen Ching Lin Zhou |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG (e-mail: steve.ching@cityu.edu.hk), HK;(2) Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, USA (e-mail: Lin.Zhou@asu.edu), US |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001 |
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