| 工程监理寻租行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 殷红春,曹玉贵.工程监理寻租行为博弈分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报,2006,6(3):108-111. |
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| 作者姓名： | 殷红春 曹玉贵 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
2. 华北水利水电学院,经济管理系,郑州,450045 |
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| 摘 要： | 在综合分析工程监理制度下业主、工程监理和承包商相互作用关系的基础上,根据公共寻租理论与委托—代理理论,分析了工程监理与承包商之间的寻租动机,并建立了业主、工程监理与承包商之间的三方博弈模型,通过对模型及博弈结果的分析,提出强化业主内部管理、提升对寻租行为的监督效率及加大对寻租活动的惩罚力度是减少工程监理中寻租行为的有效措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 工程监理 寻租 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-9107(2006)03-0108-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年9月8日 |
Game Analysis and Countermeasures of Engineering Supervisors' Rent-seeking Action |
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| YIN Hong-chun,CAO Yu-gui.Game Analysis and Countermeasures of Engineering Supervisors'' Rent-seeking Action[J].Journal of Northwest Sci-Tech University of Agriculture and Forestry(Social Science),2006,6(3):108-111. |
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| Authors: | YIN Hong-chun CAO Yu-gui |
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| Abstract: | Through comprehensive analysis of the relationship among employers,engineering supervisors and contractors,according to public rentseeking theory and principal-agent theory,the rent-seeking motive of engineering supervisors and contractors is analyzed.By establishing a three-party game model,the analysis is also made of the rent-seeking action between engineering supervisors and contractors.Based on the result of the game analysis,the conclusion has been drawn that it is an effective method to govern their rent-seeking action by intensifying employers' interior management,improving the supervising efficiency of rent-seeking and strictly punishing rent-seekers. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent engineering supervisor rent-seeking game analysis |
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