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A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood |
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| Authors: | Fabrizi Simona Lippert Steffen Pan Addison Ryan Matthew |
| Affiliation: | 1.Department of Economics and Centre for Mathematical Social Science, The University of Auckland, Sir Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Rd, 1010, Auckland, New Zealand ;2.Department of Economics, Centre for Mathematical Social Science, and Te Pūnaha Matatini, The University of Auckland, Sir Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Rd, 1010, Auckland, New Zealand ;3.Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, International Business School Suzhou (IBSS), Business Building (BS), South Campus, 8 Chongwen Road, Suzhou Dushu, Lake Science and Education Innovation District, Suzhou Industrial Park, Suzhou, 215123, People’s Republic of China ;4.School of Economics, AUT, City Campus, WY building, 120 Mayoral Drive, Private Bag 92006, 1142, Auckland, New Zealand ;5.Centre for Mathematical Social Science at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand ; |
| Abstract: | Theory and Decision - We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical... |
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