首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
Authors:Pasquier  Nicolas  Bonroy  Olivier  Garapin  Alexis
Affiliation:1.Université Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, UMR GAEL, 38000, Grenoble, France
;2.Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057, Braga, Portugal
;
Abstract:Theory and Decision - The theoretical literature on vertical relationships usually assumes that beliefs about secret contracts take specific forms. In a recent paper, Eguia et al. (Games Econ Behav...
Keywords:
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号