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Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games
Institution:1. Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Albacete 02071, Spain;2. Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Albacete 02071, Spain;1. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, University of Sassari, Via Francesco Muroni 25, Sassari 07100, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Economia e dell’Impresa, University of Florence, Via delle Pandette 32, Firenze 50127, Italy
Abstract:This paper investigates the impact of cognitive abilities and preferences on behavior in games. We first measure subjects’ logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and preferences relate to the probability of a subject being of a specific behavioral type. We find that better logical abilities increase the likelihood of sophisticated behavior. This shift is stronger for subjects who are classified as “selfish”. However, not even the most logically able, selfish subjects are identified as Nash types.
Keywords:Logical ability  Behaviors  Strategic-form games  Experiments  Preferences  Sophistication
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