Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Management, and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan, Italy;2. Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria;3. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy;1. TU Dortmund, Germany;2. Deloitte Consulting, Germany;3. University of Vechta, Germany;1. Istituto di Economia, Scuola Superiore Sant''Anna, Piazza Martiri della Libertà, 33, 56127 Pisa, Italy;2. FBK-IRVAPP, via Santa Croce, 77, 38122 Trento, Italy;1. Department of Economics, Tulane University, 208 Tilton Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118, United States;2. Department of Economics, Università Ca'' Foscari Venezia, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy;3. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Suite 429, Atlanta, GA 30303-3992, United States;4. Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, 221 McNair Hall, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX 77005-1827, United States;5. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Suite 637, 14 Marietta Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303-3992, United States;6. The African Tax Institute, University of Pretoria, South Africa |
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| Abstract: | Reducing the social distance between taxpayers and tax authorities boosts taxpayers’ acceptance of tax load and tax compliance. In the present experiment participants had the opportunity to pay their tax due either as one single compliance decision or as separate compliance decisions for each type of requested contribution (coined voice on contributions). In addition, contributions were either distributed according to a fixed scheme exogenously chosen, or participants had the possibility to change the distribution pattern (coined voice on distribution). Furthermore information about participants’ contributions was either clearly related to the tax context or related to government public expenditures (coined context). Besides analyzing the effect of voice and context on compliance, order of tax payments was controlled for in the analyses. Results show that having voice on tax contributions and on tax distribution leads to higher compliance. Moreover, compliance was higher in the context avoiding tax framing. |
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| Keywords: | Tax compliance Tax evasion Tax distribution Voice Procedural fairness |
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