信息透明度对企业诚信行为影响的博弈分析

诚信原则是市场机制的灵魂和基础.本文采用博弈论的方法,分析信息透明度对企业诚信行为选择模式的影响.在一次性博弈情况下,互不信任是交易者的理性选择;重复博弈中长期交易的双方可以达成互信关系,但不能保证不同交易者在不同交易中的诚信行为.本文在参与者不固定并且信息不完全的情况下,构建企业博弈模型.模型引入信息透明度参数,刻画信息对企业行为的影响.研究表明:如果信息透明度低于一定阀值,会出现失信扩散的恶性循环;反之,会出现相互诚信的现象.因此,增加信息透明度,建立高效的信用传递机制是解决信用缺失的关键.

A Game Analysis on Effect of Information Availability to Enterprises' Credit Behavior

Market economy is the credit economy and the principal of credibility is the foundation of market mechanism. With the development of economic reform,it is well concerned that discredit order of the society has become one of serious social problems which enhances the transaction costs of society. Using games theory and based on personal behavior models,we studied enterprises' behavior under different environments. The conclusion is that the information availability is the key factor influences enterprises' credit behavior.