Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation |
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| Authors: | Pablo Guillen, Enrique Fatas,Pablo Bra as-Garza |
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| Affiliation: | a University of Sydney, Faculty of Economics and Business, Discipline of Economics, Room 340, Merewether Building (H04), Sydney NSW 2006, Australia;b LINEEX and University of Valencia, Facultad de Economía, Campus Tarongers, 46022 Valencia, Spain;c Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Granada, Campus Universitario de La Cartuja, E-18011 Granada, Spain |
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| Abstract: | This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment. |
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| Keywords: | Social dilemmas Conditional cooperation |
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