控股股东侵占资金行为的博弈分析

运用博弈论的基本理论,建立一个控股股东与监管部门的博弈矩阵,对控股股东占用上市公司资金的行为进行博弈分析,讨论了控股股东占款的违规成本、违规概率以及监管力度对混合战略博弈纳什均衡的影响,对控股股东处于博弈优势方的现实根源作了深入分析,对有效抑制控股股东的侵占行为提出相应的政策建议。

Game Analysis on Illegal Appropriation of Capital by Controlling Shareholder of Listed Company

The illegal appropriation of Capital by the controlling shareholding of listed companies becomes increasingly serious in Chinese stock market,which results in unexpected loss of economic efficiency.Based on the game theory,the author sets up a game matrix between controlling shareholder and administration department,analyzes the gain,cost and the probability of illegal appropriation of Capital by the controlling shareholder in detail,and suggests some feasible policies to prevent this phenomenon.