| 合同线性化与线性化合同 |
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| 引用本文： | 张巍. 合同线性化与线性化合同[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, 13(3): 62-67 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张巍 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北财经大学, 大连, 116025 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文讨论了不对称信息下委托代理关系中合同的线性化与线性化的合同。我们的出发点是代理人之间的能力差异,由此诱发了同时存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题,为处理这一问题我们得到一个产出呈凹性的支付合同,并对其线性化,考虑到这一参数线性合同系的不稳定性,我们最终以无参数的线性合同来替代,从而更为接近现实中使用的合同。
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| 关 键 词： | 线性合同 委托代理 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2005)03-0062-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-06-15; |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-06-15 |
The Linearization of Contracts and Linear Contracts |
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| ZHANG Wei. The Linearization of Contracts and Linear Contracts[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, 13(3): 62-67 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Wei |
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| Affiliation: | Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China |
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| Abstract: | The paper discusses the linearization of contracts and linear contracts in principal-agent relationships under asymmetric information.Our Starting point is the difference of capability between agents;therefore adverse selection and moral hazard coexist.To handle such a problem,we get a parametrized payment contract concave on output,linearize it,and in view of its instability substitute it with non-parametrized linear contracts,which is more approximate to realistic contracts. |
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| Keywords: | linear contracts principal-agent adverse selection moral hazard |
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