胡塞尔的意向性概念

现象学的最初含义是,探讨意义概念的认识渊源,进一步说,研究意义意向与意义实现之间的关系。在这个问题上,胡塞尔同意康德的观点:思维没有直观是空的,直观没有思维是盲的。它的基本意思是:认识不能限于思维而要实现于直观,否则就不是完整的认识过程。因此,认识的重心应落在意义意向通过相应的直观得到实现的问题上。这种实现并不局限于康德式的感性直观,胡塞尔认为,直观分成两种,范畴的或意义的直观,感性的或个别的直观,这两种直观的对象分别是一般之物与个别之物,其含义相同:对象不仅被思维所意向,而且它就自明地呈现在我们面前,被经验所描述。站在现象学立场上,胡塞尔把思维和直观都归属于意向经验。因此,在这个意义上,现象学的分析就是意向经验分析。

Husserl's Intentional Concept

The original orientation of phenomenology aimed at the cognitive origin of the concept of meaning, or, the study of the relation between meaning intention and meaning realization. In this aspect, Husserl agrees with Kant that thinking without intuition is empty and intuition without thinking is blind, whose basic meaning is that understanding should not be confined to thinking but from intuition, otherwise it is not a complete process. Thus, its focus is on the realization of meaning intended through the corresponding intuition. This realization is not confined to Kantian conceptual intuition. Husserl classifies intuition into two kinds, intuition of category or meaning; conceptual or individual intuition. The objects of the two intuitions are the general and the individual with the same connotations. The objects are not only the intention of thinking but also stand out by themselves and are described by experience. From the perspective of phenomenology, Husserl classifies thinking and intuition into intentional experience. Thus, in this sense phenomenological analysis is the analysis of intentional experience.