WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS |
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| Authors: | LINDA C. BABCOCK JOHN ENGBERG AMIHAI GLAZER |
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| Affiliation: | Associate Professor of Economics, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Penn., Phone 1-412-268-8789 Fax 1-412-268-7902, E-mail;Assistant Professor of Economics, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Penn., Phone 1-412-268-6281 Fax 1-412-268-7902, E-mail;Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine Phone 1-714-824-5974, Fax 1-714-824-2182 E-mail |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
We model the politics of wage and employment determination for unionized public-sector workers who can strike. If the employment level affects the identity of the decisive voter in budget referenda and other elections, then unions may be able to increase wages by increasing employment. We identify conditions under which public sector unionization will lead to increased wages and employment; we also show that a majority of voters may favor unionization. (JEL 545, J51, H4) |
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