| 考虑分销商销量的可变回购契约机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 尹洪英,徐丽群,权小锋.考虑分销商销量的可变回购契约机制研究[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2009,8(1):33-37. |
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| 作者姓名： | 尹洪英 徐丽群 权小锋 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
2. 厦门大学,管理学院,福建,厦门,361005 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究一个制造商与一个零售商组成的分销系统，制造商根据分销商的销售量提出一个可变回购契约，研究表明当制造商为供应链中的领导者时，制造商所采用的可变回收价格系数的Stackelberg模型的子博弈精炼Nash均衡解是他采用固定回收价格时的均衡解减去产品剩余价值的值，也就是制造商会通过可变回收价格系数来得到更多利润，为更有力的激励零售商销售产品，制造商应采用高于Stackelberg模型的子博弈精炼Nash均衡解的可变回收系数使得零售商提高订货量。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 Stackelberg模型 回购契约机制 |
Research on Variable Buy-Back Contract Mechanism Considering the Sales of Retailer |
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| YIN Hong-ying,XU Li-qun,QUAN Xiao-feng.Research on Variable Buy-Back Contract Mechanism Considering the Sales of Retailer[J].Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University Social Sciences Edition,2009,8(1):33-37. |
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| Authors: | YIN Hong-ying XU Li-qun QUAN Xiao-feng |
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| Institution: | 1.Antai College of Economics & Management;Shanghai Jiaotong University;Shanghai 200052;China;2.School of Nanagement;Xiamen University;Xiamen Fujian 361005;China |
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| Abstract: | A study is made within a distribution system consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer in the supply chain management.The manufacturer provides a variable buy-back contract according to the sale of the retailer.This research reveals that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the variable price coefficient in the variable buy-back contract mechanism Stackelberg Model is equal to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium price in the fixed buy-back contract mechanism Stackelberg Model minus the salvage ... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain management Stackelberg Model buy-back contract mechanism |
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