基于声誉约束的民间金融组织风险及其防范

从发起者和参与者博弈的角度解释：参与者会基于发起者的资金回报承诺、发起者本人的信誉和相应的法律约束对民间金融组织进行投资;随着组织规模扩大,发起人违约成本减少、违约收益增加使得发起者放弃声誉而导致民间金融组织风险爆发;在极端情形下民间金融组织继续运营的最低限度依赖于市场在未来对违约者的惩罚,而这一惩罚不能低于发起者违约而获得本应属于参与者参与组织的利息收益。

Risk of Informal Financial Organization: Based On Reputation

Using game theory to explain：the relationship between the Initiator and the Participant;the participant based on initiator＇s repayment pledge;reputation and the legal restraint to invests informal financial organization.With scale expanding of the organization,the initiator penalty cost reduces and the violation income increasing gives,all these cause for the initiator to give up reputation,so the informal financial organization risk erupts.In the extreme condition,the informal financial organization relies on the future market penalty for the initiator,and this penalty must be more than the interest income that belongs to the participant.