六方会谈：决策树模型视角下的“猎鹿困境”

朝核问题是国际核不扩散体系中最令人关切的核心问题之一。朝核问题的症结在于怎样解读和执行朝鲜半岛无核化,在于美国的军事存在及敌视政策与朝鲜安全诉求的负相关性,在于现存国际法致使捍卫国家安全的正当性和维护国际安全的法理性二者相悖,而消弭这一悖论的纳什均衡点难以寻求。作者以决策树模型和猎鹿博弈理论,论证了解决朝核问题的机制——六方会谈的实质是购买朝鲜弃核。本文认为,该机制本身孕育了致使其难以成功的困境,并进而得出朝鲜难以在现存国际体系下和平弃核,以朝鲜半岛中立化机制内化掉朝核问题未尝不是最佳出路。

Six - Party Talks: The Predicament of the Stag Hunt Game in the Perspective of the Decision Tree

The North Korean Nuclear Issue is one of the core issues which are most deeply concerned in the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.The cruxes of North Korean Nuclear Issue lie in （1） how to understand and execute the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula,（2） in a negative correlation between American Military Presence and DPRK’s want of security,（3） the present international laws resulting in a couple of contradictions between the legitimacy of the international security being ensured and the justification of the national security being safeguarded.However,the Nash Equilibrium which can eliminate this paradox is difficult to be found.The author demonstrates on the basis of the Decision Tree and the Stag Hunt Game that the essence of the Six-Party Talks is to clear nuclear weapons on North Korea by buying and it cultivates the factors of failure.Overall,the option suggested here is that it is difficult for North Korea to peacefully abandon all nuclear weapons in the current international system,so perhaps it’s the best approach to melt the North Korean Nuclear Issue into thin air by building Korean Peninsula neutralization mechanism.