A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania, United States, and Escuela de Administracion, Universidad ICESI, Colombia;2. Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark;3. School of Economics, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom;4. School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia |
| |
Abstract: | We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and found to be compliant. The first, as is the case in most extant tax systems, does not discriminate between the un-audited and those found compliant. The second targets the redistribution in favor of those found compliant. We find that targeting increases compliance when paying taxes generates a social return. We do not find any increase in compliance in a control treatment where individuals audited and found compliant receive symbolic rewards. We conclude that existing tax mechanisms have room for improvement by rewarding those audited and found compliant. |
| |
Keywords: | Tax evasion Rewards Audits C91 C92 D91 H26 3020 Group & Interpersonal Processes 2910 Social Structure & Organization |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|