道德知识与伦理客观性

关于道德知识的本质的问题与道德辩护问题密切相关。道德虚无主义认为没有什么东西在根本上值得在乎,因为没有什么东西是道德上错的。这个观点已经成为我们时代的人类状况的一个标记。面对虚无主义的这个挑战,很多道德哲学家已经感觉到为人类道德提供一个辩护的迫切性。传统的道德实在论被认为是回应这个挑战的一种有力方式,但有趣的是,这种实在论不仅在某种意义上导致了道德怀疑论,而且也不能对道德动机提出合理的说明。另一方面,非认知主义的道德理论在能够说明道德动机的可能性的同时,却被认为也是道德怀疑论和道德虚无主义的一个来源。本文旨在考察这两种观点之间的一些主要张力,在批评道德知识的物理知识模型的基础上,通过借助于休谟、康德和亚里士多德的观点来试图表明道德知识是一种反思性的知识,并由此对怀疑论和虚无主义的挑战做出一个回答。

Moral Knowledge and Ethic Objectivity

The problems concerning the nature of moral knowledge are closely related to the problems concerning the defense of morality. Moral nihilism basically cares nothing because it holds nithing is wrong morally. This understanding has become a symbol of human status in modern times. Facing this challenge, quite a few philosophers of morality feel the urgency for the defense of human morality. Some people believe that the traditional moral realism is a good response to this challenge but it in fact leads to a kind of moral skepticism and cannot give a reasonable explanation of moral motives. On the other hand, though the moral theory of non-cognitivism can help explain some moral motives, it is considered as a source of moral nihilism and moral skepticism. This research analyzes some tension between the two concepts. Based on the model of physics knowledge that criticizes moral knowledge, and using the ideas of Hume, Kant and Aristotle, this research tries to prove that moral knowledge is a kind of reflective knowledge and expects that it could respond to the challenge of skepticism and nihilism.