公共选择理论与我国政府机构改革

纵观中国政府历次机构改革 ,仍不能完全摆脱“精简—膨胀—再精简—再膨胀”的怪圈。本文试从公共选择理论的“经济人假定”出发 ,指出 :政府机构及其人员的“经济人”行为倾向 ,才是机构改革“怪圈”产生的真正原因。在此基础上 ,本文以公共选择的理论视角对我国机构改革“怪圈”问题进行了分析 ,并提出了克服这一问题的有关建议

Public Choice Theory and China’s reform of government organization

Generally speaking, the proceeding reform of Chinese government organization is succeeding as expected. At this crucial stage, the vicious circle of “reduction and overstaffed” like previous times still exists to some extent. Using the “Homo Economicus” which is a hypothesis of the Public Choice Theory, the author attempts to argue that the true reason for the above mentioned circle is the bureaucrats’ “Economicus” action. After analyzing many problems and drawbacks existing in the current reform, this thesis, from the point view of the Public Choice Theory, puts forward strategies and ways to break the vicious circle.