主体公平关切行为对联合体工程总承包项目优化的影响

对于设计施工联合体工程总承包项目，优化收益分配是项目优化能否达成的关键，关系到总承包优势能否得以充分发挥。而优化收益分配不仅受主体理性行为的影响，还将受主体公平关切行为的影响。从行为科学角度出发，基于博弈理论构建相应的优化收益模型、公平关切函数和收益分配模型；设置仅设计或仅施工方具有公平关切，以及双方均具有公平关切3种情景，选取收益分配可行域、收益均值、收益期望值、收益最大值4个指标，模拟分析了主体公平关切行为对联合体工程总承包项目优化收益及其分配的影响。结果表明:联合体双方适当的公平关切行为对提升其自身收益有利；但过高的公平关切程度会使项目优化收益分配可行域急剧减小，项目优化事项落地的可能性及优化收益期望值也会随之减小。

Analyzing the Influence of Fairness Concerns on the Optimal Benefit of the Union General Contracting Project

When designing enterprises and construction enterprises are united to carry out a general contracting project, profit distribution is the key to the optimization of the project, which determines whether the advantages of general contracting can be given full play. However, profit distribution is not only affected by subjects'' rational behavior, but also affected by the behavior of subjects'' fairness concerns. From the perspective of behavioral science, based on game theory, the revenue model, fairness concern model and profit distribution model of the optimal benefit of general contracting projects were constructed in this paper. Then, three scenarios were set:either the designing enterprise or the construction enterprise has fairness concerns, and both sides have fairness concerns. Four indices-the feasible region of profit distribution, average profit, expected profit, and maximum profit-were selected to analyze the impact of subjects'' fairness concerns on a project''s optimal benefits and benefit distribution through simulation. The research results showed that appropriate fairness concerns of the subjects were beneficial to the promotion of their own benefits. However, when they paid too much attention to fairness concerns, it would lead to a drastic reduction in the viable region of the project''s optimal benefit allocation; at the same time, the likelihood of project optimization and the expected return of project optimization would decline.