| 税收流失的新思考 |
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| 引用本文： | 孟菲,段玉峰.税收流失的新思考[J].江南大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004,3(6):52-56. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孟菲 段玉峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 江南大学,商学院,江苏,无锡,214063
2. 无锡科研设计院,江苏,无锡,214035 |
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| 摘 要： | 税收流失不仅导致国家财政收入的减少,而且扭曲了市场经济体制下政府与市场经济主体之间的分配关系。文章用博弈论对税收流失的成因从理论上加以分析,并结合我国国情,借鉴国际经验,提出一系列综合治理税收流失的对策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 税收流失 非合作博弈 委托代理 激励约束机制 诚信税收 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-6973(2004)06-0052-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年2月20日 |
Reconsideration on Tax Revenue Loss |
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| MENG Fei,DUAN Yu-feng.Reconsideration on Tax Revenue Loss[J].Journal of Southern Yangtze University:Humanities & Social Sciences Edition,2004,3(6):52-56. |
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| Authors: | MENG Fei DUAN Yu-feng |
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| Abstract: | Tax revenue loss not only leads to the reduction of national fiscal revenue, but also does harm to the allocation relations between the government and the agents of the market economy. This article theoretically analyzes the causes of tax loss using the game theory. And by considering the situation in China, this paper puts forward a series of measures for controlling tax revenue loss. |
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| Keywords: | tax revenue loss none-cooperative game principal-agent problem incentive and constraint system creditable taxation |
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