首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

善概念的普遍定义如何可行--从人的意识的先天内在结构出发演绎善概念
引用本文:崔平.善概念的普遍定义如何可行--从人的意识的先天内在结构出发演绎善概念[J].河北学刊,2006,26(3):23-29.
作者姓名:崔平
作者单位:中共河北省委党校,哲学部,河北,石家庄,050061
摘    要:一种彻底的伦理理性不能回避善的定义。但伦理学史中所进行的定义善的努力都因存在重大缺陷而屡遭挫败。它们的共同缺点在于没有充分认识到善是最高的伦理范畴,在逻辑上应该超越伦理论域来寻求定义方法。本文根据善的主观认识本性而把它的根源回溯到意识存在的普遍形式,然后用精心设计的纯粹普遍思维路径尝试打破摩尔制造的善概念不可定义的神话。

关 键 词:存在形式  目的  应当  价值  
文章编号:1003-7071(2006)03-0023-07
修稿时间:2005年2月18日

The Universal Definition of "Goodness" Is Feasible --To Deduct "Goodness" from the Innate Inner Structure
CUI Ping.The Universal Definition of "Goodness" Is Feasible --To Deduct "Goodness" from the Innate Inner Structure[J].Hebei Academic Journal,2006,26(3):23-29.
Authors:CUI Ping
Abstract:Goodness cannot be escaped from ethic studies, but in ethic history no one gives a universal definition of Goodness because of some deficiencies or other. Their common points are that they cannot realize that Goodness is the highest in ethic category. Its definition should be sought beyond ethic in logic. This paper, according to the subjective essentiality of understanding, traces its origin into the universal existing form of consciousness, and then attempts to break through the non - definition of Goodness put forward by Moore in a delicately designed way of pure thinking.
Keywords:existing form  purpose  ought to  value  Goodness
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号