立法导向、投资者诉讼与上市公司治理水平改善

治理水平改善是提高上市公司质量、促进证券市场健康发展的有效途径。本文沿着LLSV模型的研究思路、并在对其进行扩展的基础上,建立恰当的博弈论模型分析证券法的立法导向和投资者诉讼对上市公司治理水平改善的影响,并利用75个国家(地区)的相关数据样本对理论模型的主要结果进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,在立法导向上应确立以投资者诉讼权利保障为核心的理念,强制性信息披露和董事责任对于公司治理水平的改善没有显著作用;对于上市公司治理水平改善而言,法院审判活动的公正性至关重要,诉讼案件持续期限尽管有正向影响,但不具备统计上的显著性,而投资者支付的直接诉讼成本则对上市公司的行为没有显著影响。

Tendency of Legislature,Investor Litigation and Improvement of Corporate Governance

Improvement of corporate governance is the effective way to improve the quality of the listed companies and promote the stock market to develop healthily.On the basis of expanding the LLSV basic model,this paper sets up an appropriate game theory model to analyse the effects of the tendency of legis lature of Securities Law and investor litigation on the improvement of corporate governance research think ing of LLSV model,and makes impirical test of hypothesizes drawing from the theoretical model by using relevant data samples from 75 countries and regions.The following two major findings are obtained:First1y,the tendency of legislature of Securities Law should be focused on the investor suit rights,while the mandating disclosure and directors' liability don't have significant influence on the corporate governance.Seco ndly,among those law enforcement factors,the impartiality of courts are most important to the improvement of corporate governance,the duration of a lawsuit also has positive effect,but that effect is very weak.while the direct cost in a lawsuit does not matter.