| 基于职业观念的经营者多期组合激励合同研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈爽英,唐小我,邵云飞.基于职业观念的经营者多期组合激励合同研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(4):111-115. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈爽英 唐小我 邵云飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学管理学院, 成都 610054 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金;国家社会科学基金;电子科技大学哲学社会科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在现有的基于职业观念的隐性激励文献研究基础上,建立经营者多期组合激励模型,进而得到最优激励,并给出此激励的特征。同时通过理论推导与实证分析证明,随着经营者工作年数的增加,基于职业观念的隐性激励减弱,显性报酬合同的激励强度随之增强。
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| 关 键 词： | 组合激励 职业观念 隐性激励 显性激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2007)04-0111-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-10-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年10月12 |
Studying Manager's Multiperiod Combinative Incentive Contracts Based on Career Concerns |
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| CHEN Shuang-ying,TANG Xiao-wo,SHAO Yun-fei.Studying Manager''''s Multiperiod Combinative Incentive Contracts Based on Career Concerns[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2007,15(4):111-115. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Shuang-ying TANG Xiao-wo SHAO Yun-fei |
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| Institution: | University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Chengdu, 610054, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the recognition of defects in the literatures on implicit incentives accordant to career's co ncern s,we model manager's multiperiod combinative incentives,derive the optimal incentives,and study the features in the optimal incentives.We testify that implicit incentives based on career concerns decrease and explicit incentives increase with manager's working year increasing. |
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| Keywords: | combinatove contract career concerns implicit incentives explicit incentives |
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