Social compromise and social metrics |
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| Authors: | D. E. Campbell S. I. Nitzan |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, M5S 1A1 Toronto, Canada;(2) Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52100 Ramat Gan, Israel |
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| Abstract: | In the context of constitutional design, a committee of citizens' representatives proposes (social choice) axioms. The outcome should not necessarily be the aggregation rule, or rules, satisfying each of the axioms. Alternative procedures are recommended for aggregating a set of axioms into a single summary axiom. The summary axiom generates a single social decision function when a social metric is applied. |
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