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民工荒的进化博弈解读
引用本文:陈宝国,丁长青.民工荒的进化博弈解读[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007,9(4):28-30.
作者姓名:陈宝国  丁长青
作者单位:1. 河海大学,商学院,江苏,南京,210098;福州大学,人文社会科学学院,福建,福州,350002
2. 河海大学,商学院,江苏,南京,210098
摘    要:从有限理性的进化博弈视野出发,分析民工荒现象出现的演化机理,将处于相同境况的民工视为一个群体,将民工个体的决策置身于民工群体决策中,则个体民工选择某种策略从民工群体角度来看就是以一定的概率选择该种策略。面对收益与风险并存的民工流动,民工荒进化稳定策略形成不但取决于区域企业需求的特性,而且依赖于民工群体间相互竞争的策略。

关 键 词:民工  民工荒  进化博弈
文章编号:1671-4970(2007)04-0028-03
修稿时间:2007年6月18日

Analysis of Evolutionary Game on the Shortage of Migrant Workers
Chen Baoguo.Analysis of Evolutionary Game on the Shortage of Migrant Workers[J].Journal of Hohai University(Philosophy and Social Sciences),2007,9(4):28-30.
Authors:Chen Baoguo
Abstract:Based on the viewpoint of the evolutionary game of limited ration,this paper analyzes the evolutionary mechanism resulting from the shortage of migrant workers.Viewing the migrant workers of the same situation as a group and the decision-making of individual migrant worker as that of migrant workers being a group,then,the strategic selection of the individual migrant worker can be regarded as a certain probability of choosing the tactics from the perspective of the group of migrant workers.Faced with both benefits and risks in the mobility of migrant workers,the formation of the stable and balanced strategy on the evolution of the shortage of migrant workers' phenomenon depends not only on the features of the enterprises' needs,but on the decision-making of the competition between the groups of migrant workers.
Keywords:migrant workers  shortage of migrant workers  evolutionary game
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