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价格柔性合同下的原材料采购策略及风险分析
引用本文:慕银平,刘利明.价格柔性合同下的原材料采购策略及风险分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):108-117.
作者姓名:慕银平  刘利明
作者单位:电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 四川 成都 610054
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71172096);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005)
摘    要:为了降低原材料价格波动给采购-供应双方企业带来的风险,供应链企业通常采用签订价格合同的方式来共同分担原材料价格波动的风险。本文通过设计价格柔性合同,利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的采购系统的最优采购策略及原材料价格波动风险的分担机制。研究表明,通过实施价格柔性合同可以降低供应双方的风险,且通过设置合理的价格柔性系数可以提高双方的收益。

关 键 词:采购管理  价格柔性合同  Stackelberg博弈  风险分担  
收稿时间:2012-10-31
修稿时间:2013-09-26

Procurement Policy and Risk Sharing under Price Flexibility Contract
MU Yin-ping;LIU Li-ming.Procurement Policy and Risk Sharing under Price Flexibility Contract[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2015,23(3):108-117.
Authors:MU Yin-ping;LIU Li-ming
Institution:School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
Abstract:Raw material price fluctuation can induce the seller or the buyer to face the potential risk in the future transactions. In order to reduce the risk, the firms usually use price contracts to make them share the risk of the raw material price fluctuation. In this paper, a supply chain is considered consist of a supplier and a retailer, where the retailer buys the raw material from the supplier at the beginning of the lead time and the supplier delivers the raw material to the retailer some time later. A price flexibility contract is designed to share the profit risk between the supplier and the retailer. Using Stackelberg game the paper built mathematic model to optimize the procurement risk-sharing mechanism and provided the optimal parameters for the flexible supply contract. The results show that supply contract with proper parameters can improve the profit of the supplier and the retailer respectively. By analyzing the profit variance. It is also found that the optimal flexible supply contract can reduce the profit risk of the supplier and the retailer significantly.
Keywords:procurement management  price flexibility contract  Stackelberg game  risk-sharing  
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