我国经济转轨时期寻租的因素分析

本文从不完全信息静态博弈的角度,对寻租问题进行了博弈分析。通过分析,从理论上揭示了博弈双方的行为动机及博弈均衡结果,说明在给定的制度安排下,各个行为主体追求自身收益最大化的结果会导致寻租的概率与政策性租金的数额正相关,与寻租行为被举报或案发的可能性以及对寻租的惩罚力度负相关。并在此理论框架基础上,阐述了我国经济转轨时期寻租泛滥的制度及微观经济因素。

Analysis of the Rent-seeking Factors in the Economic Transition Period

The thesis analyzes the issue of rent-seeking from the angle of static state game,theoretically reveals the motive and the balanced consequence of the participants of the game,and points out that,under the given system,all the participants maximize their profit,which results in the fact that the rent-seeking rate is direct proportional to the sum of policy rent-money but is inversely proportional to the possibility that the rent-seeking activities are exposed and punished.Based on the theory,the thesis illustrates the systematic and microeconomic factors that cause the overflowing of the rent-seeking in the period of economic transition.