| 基于管理人员EVA奖金激励机制的优化设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗勇,胡奇英.基于管理人员EVA奖金激励机制的优化设计[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2006,16(2):98-102. |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗勇 胡奇英 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安电子科技大学,陕西,西安,710071
2. 上海大学,上海,201800 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托代理理论认为:使代理人采取最优行为的最好办法是选择合适的奖金激励机制。本文在简要的分析传统的奖金激励机制和股票期权的特点和不足的基础上,设计和分析了3个EVA奖金激励机制模型,以便更好的解决企业目标和管理人员目标的统一和优化问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 经济增加值 激励机制 委托代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-472X(2006)02-0098-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年8月17日 |
Optimal Design Based on EVA Bonus Motivation Mechanism of the Managers |
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| LUO Yong,Hu Qi-ying.Optimal Design Based on EVA Bonus Motivation Mechanism of the Managers[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2006,16(2):98-102. |
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| Authors: | LUO Yong Hu Qi-ying |
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| Abstract: | According to agency theory,the best way of making agents take optimal action is to choose appropriate bonus motivation mechanism.After brief analyzing characteristic and the lack of traditional bonus motivation mechanism and stock expect,this paper designs and analyzes three models of EVA bonus motivation mechanism.These will settle much better unification and optimization problems between the aim of corporation and managers. |
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| Keywords: | EVA motivation mechanism agency |
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