商业银行风险承担行为的激励合约选择

商业银行的风险水平在一定程度上取决于管理者的风险承担行为,因此,恰当的管理者行为激励对于商业银行的风险控制至关重要.为克服已有研究缺乏对商业银行管理者激励合约设计的关注,以及正式激励合约的外在考核变量低效等问题,本文试图通过扩展已有理论模型,综合考虑商业银行管理者风险承担行为结果的真实信息和外在信息,从关系合约与正式合约选择的角度,建立一个更为全面和灵活的商业银行管理者风险承担行为的激励合约框架.

Incentive Contracts Choices on Risk-Taking Behaviors of Commercial Banks

Appropriate incentives for managers’ behaviors are critical for the risk control of commercial banks,due to the fact that the risk level of commercial banks depends on the risk-taking behaviors of managers to a certain extent.Extant studies did not pay enough attention to the design of incentive contracts for managers’ behaviors of commercial banks,nor did formal incentive contracts have effective external evaluation variables.This paper tried to establish a more comprehensive and flexible framework of incentive contracts for commercial banks managers’ risk-taking behaviors from the perspective of relational contracts and formal contracts.This framework would be developed by extending extant theoretical models and overall examining the real information and external information of the effects of commercial banks managers’ risk-taking behaviors.