机械系统结构动力学方程的李群分析法

“农业龙头企业+农户”模式存在高违约率，这导致合作失败成为普遍现象。从农户视角，基于海南、湖北、江西等5省共257户农户调研数据，构建了一个“农业龙头企业+农户”营销渠道关系风险、治理机制和交易绩效的关系模型，实证分析关系风险对治理机制选择的影响以及治理机制阈值效应。结果显示：农户基于关系风险选择不同的治理机制，进而对交易绩效产生不同的影响。治理机制不仅对关系风险和交易绩效间的关系存在中介效应，而且对交易绩效存在阈值效应，即低水平的信任和传统社会规范治理对交易绩效存在显著正向影响，而高水平的信任和传统社会规范治理对交易绩效的影响不显著；低水平的权力治理对交易绩效不存在显著影响，而高水平的权力治理对交易绩效的负向影响显著。

Relational Risk and Transaction Governance in the Model of a Leading Agricultural Enterprise with Peasant Households

The model of a leading agricultural enterprise with peasant households has a high default rate which makes the failure of cooperation a common phenomenon. Based on survey data of 257 farmer households in Hainan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Henan and Shanxi provinces, this paper constructs a model of a leading enterprise with peasant households on the links between relational relationship, governance mechanisms and transaction performance, and empirically analyzes the influence of relational risk on governance mechanism choice and the threshold effect of governance mechanism. Results show that farmers choose different trading governance mechanism on the basis of relational risk, which has different impact on the performance. Governance mechanism not only has a mediating effect on the relationship between relational risk and transaction performance, but also has threshold effect on transaction performance, namely low level of trust and traditional social norms governance has a significantly positive impact on performance, while high level of trust and traditional social norms governance has no significant effect on trade performance. Low level of power governance has no important effect in the trade performance, while high level of power governance has a tremendously negative impact on the trading performance.