论环境规制中的法院角色——从环境公益诉讼的模式选择说开去

环境民事公益诉讼与环境行政公益诉讼的相继法治化，滋生出一种通过诉讼方式维护环境公益的程序竞合，并引发了现实中的模式选择难题。"扬"环境行政公益诉讼"抑"环境民事公益诉讼的模式选择主张，根源于学界对法院承担环境规制职能的忌惮。实际上，在"夜警国家""福利国家"和"风险社会"，法院以私人讼争裁决者为底色，根据社会情势变迁还承担了环境规制制衡者和环境规制替代者的角色。法院的环境规制替代者角色可以从"代理彩票理论"中得到证成，加之法院和政府在环境规制中存在优势和功能互补的特性，双方的合作规制成为一种"次优选择"，这也就决定了环境民事公益诉讼与环境行政公益诉讼"二元并重"才是环境公益诉讼的应然模式选择。

Research on the Role of Court in Environmental Regulation—Thinking From the Mode Selection of Environmental Public Interest Litigation

The successive legalization of environmental civil public interest litigation and environmental administrative public interest litigation has fostered a process of competition for maintaining environmental public welfare through litigation,and triggered a real problem of mode selection. The mode selection of "developing" environmental administrative public interest litigation and "suppressing" environmental civil public interest litigation is rooted in the academic community''s taboo against the court''s environmental regulation function. In fact,in the "night watchman state","welfare state" and "risk society",The court plays a fundamental role in resolving private litigation,at the same time,it plays the role of the regulator and Substitutor of environmental regulation according to social changes. The role of the court as a substitutor of environmental regulation can be proved from the "The Delegation Lottery Theory",the complementary nature of government and court makes the cooperative regulation a "second-best choice",which in turn determines the duality of environmental administrative public interest litigation and environmental civil public interest litigation should be the mode selection of environment public interest litigation.