基于演化博弈的僵尸企业退出机制

僵尸企业被困市场自救无力，需要政府部门发挥积极的引导作用。针对僵尸企业的退出机制，从僵尸企业、银行、政府三方出发，建立演化博弈模型展开研究。分析结果表明，当前实施的专项补助策略主要对大型国有僵尸企业的退出有加速作用，中小型僵尸企业的退出仍然面临着较高的阻碍效应。政府加强对银行的监管及对“僵尸借贷”行为的惩戒能够从根源上减少僵尸企业的产生，并迫使已经存在的僵尸企业退出市场，而简化破产程序等降低退出成本的手段能够加快清理全部的僵尸企业。长远看来，政府需要进一步放松对企业和银行的干预，并引导大家理性看待破产行为，减轻破产企业负责人的心理压力，降低破产带来的人力资本价值损失，以预防新僵尸企业的产生。

The Exit Mechanism of Zombie Enterprises based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Zombie enterprises have been trapped in the market and unable to help themselves. They need government departments to play an active guiding role. From three perspectives of zombie enterprises, banks and governments, this an evolutionary game theory was constructed to analyze the exit mechanism of zombie enterprises. The results show that the special subsidy strategy has accelerated the withdrawal of large state-owned zombie enterprises, while small and medium zombie enterprises still face a high withdrawal impediment. The government's strengthening of banking regulation and the punishment of“zombie lending”can reduce the emergence of zombie enterprises from the root and force existing zombie enterprises out of the market. Simplifying bankruptcy procedures to lower exit costs can speed up the clearance of all zombie enterprises. In the long run, in order to prevent the emergence of new zombie enterprises, the government needs to further loosen the intervention with enterprises and banks and guide people to view bankruptcy rationally, which can reduce the psychological pressure of enterprise leaders and the loss of human capital value.