基于可变风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制研究

本文研究了风险偏好与风险成本,分析了知识型员工风险偏好的特征,利用委托代理模型讨论了确定与不确定环境下员工风险偏好与企业激励强度之间的关系,并对如何协调两者的冲突以及知识型员工与企业间协调作用的特征进行了剖析.研究表明随着员工风险规避度的增大,企业应减小激励强度与风险分担;一定条件下企业和员工可协调对方的行为,但企业的激励措施居于主导地位;与一般员工相比,知识型员工的风险规避度较小且更具可变性,影响企业激励行为的能力更强,与企业间基于可变风险偏好的激励协调行为更可能发生.

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Knowledge Workers Based on Alterable Risk Preference

In this paper,we studied the risk preference and risk cost,and analyzed the character of knowledge workers' risk preference.Using the principal-agent model,we discussed the relationship between knowledge workers' risk preference and the enterprise's incentive intensity under the certain and uncertain conditions.Furthermore we explored how to solve the conflicts between the two factors and the characters of adjustment between knowledge workers and the enterprise.We got three main conclusions: 1)The enterprise should reduce the incentive intensity and risk share with the increasing of workers' risk averse;2)The enterprise and workers can adjust the action of each other under some condition,and the enterprise's incentive action is dominant;3)compared with common workers,the risk averse of knowledge workers is smaller and more alterable,knowledge workers have a stronger influence on the enterprise,and the adjustment of incentive action based on alterable risk preference between knowledge workers and the enterprise is more likely to occur.