需求扰动下闭环供应链的收益费用共享契约研究

本文研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的零售商负责回收闭环供应链。指出通过收益费用共享契约可协调解决分散式决策闭环供应链中存在的“双边际效应”问题，提高其运营效益。当突发事件引起市场需求中的最大市场需求规模发生扰动时，通过对集中式决策闭环供应链的最优决策与稳定环境下起协调作用的收益费用共享契约协调零售商所得到的最优决策进行比较分析，结果表明：稳定环境下的收益费用共享契约将不能协调突发事件干扰下的分散式决策闭环供应链。基于收益费用共享契约的协调机理对其参数进行改进可再次协调突发事件干扰下的分散式决策闭环供应链，并且该契约也能够协调稳定环境下的分散式决策闭环供应链。最后，通过算例验证了本文的主要结论并说明了收益费用共享契约的价值。

The Study of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination under Demand Disruption with Revenue and Expense Sharing Contract

A retailer collecting closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is studied in this paper. Using revenue and expense sharing contract, double marginalization problem in the decentralized decision-making CLSC can be solved, and benefits can be improved. In the case that demand is disrupted, the optimal decision results of centralized decision-making CLSC is compared to optimal decision results of retailer who is coordinated by the revenue and expense sharing contract. The revenue and expense sharing contract is effective in stable environment in decentralized decision-making CLSC,in which manufacturer bears the deviation cost. It is shows that the coordination of the decentralized decision-making CLSC is broken off. Parameters of revenue and expense sharing contract based on it coordinating mechanism are improved, and the improved contract can coordinate the decentralized decision-making CLSC under disruption as well in stable environment. Finally, numerical example is given to prove the main conclusion of this paper and illustrate the value of revenue and expense sharing contract.