不对称信息下创新产品研发外包的甄别契约设计

在创新产品研发过程中，许多企业会将部分研发模块外包，而接包方能力水平和成本信息的不对称，会给发包方带来收益风险。对此采用委托代理理论中的信息甄别模型，将研发的接包方分为高成本系数和低成本系数两类，由创新企业设计包含固定支付和收益共享系数两个参数的外包甄别契约，来推断其真实能力。通过考虑创新研发成功的概率因素和技术成果转化后的市场收益分成，以激励接包方做出最优的努力。研究结果表明：高成本系数接包方的收益共享系数将被向下扭曲，低成本系数接包方既获得了保留效用，还会得到额外的信息租金；契约中两类参数的取值受到不同类型接包方所占比例的影响，随着市场中高成本系数企业数量的增加，发包方的期望收益降低。

Screening Contract Design for Innovative Product R&D Outsourcing under Asymmetric Information

In the innovative products R&D outsourcing project, the asymmetric cost information of the outsourcing enterprise brings income risk to the contracting enterprise. Focused on such issues, the screening model in principal-agent theory is used to incentive the outsourcing enterprise disclose their real cost information. The contracting enterprise provides the outsourcing screening contract to outsourcing enterprises which divided into two kinds, the higher cost factor and the lower cost factor. The screening contract is designed with two main parameters called fixed payment and revenue sharing coefficient to induce the outsourcing enterprises to choose the suitable contract and give the optimal level of effort. The conclusions imply that the fixed payment and revenue sharing coefficient in screening contract are affected by the proportion of the number of two kinds of different cost factor outsourcing enterprises, and the outsourcer with lower cost factor gets not only reservation utility but extra information rent. With the number of high cost factor outsourcers in the market increasing, the contractors may reduce the expected profits.