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投服中心参加股东大会的投资者保护效应
引用本文:李雪婧,肖淑芳,王茜雅.投服中心参加股东大会的投资者保护效应[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2023,25(2):146-162.
作者姓名:李雪婧  肖淑芳  王茜雅
作者单位:1.北京理工大学 管理与经济学院,北京 100081
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目“投资者服务中心保护中小股东权益的机制与效果研究”(71972010);国家自然科学基金面上项目“权益薪酬契约对企业创新的影响机理与实证检验”(71672010);国家自然科学基金面上项目“创新驱动型并购的影响因素与经济后果研究”(71672007);国家自然科学基金面上项目“企业集团的债券管理模式:影响因素与经济后果”(72072012)
摘    要:中证中小投资者服务中心(简称“投服中心”)是中小股东积极主义的倡导者和践行者,探究其行权活动是否有助于中小投资者利益保护是有意义的。采用2017—2019年投服中心参加股东大会行权的数据,结合倾向得分匹配法与双重差分模型,系统地探究了投服中心参加股东大会行权对中小投资者保护的影响。结果发现:(1)投服中心参加股东大会行权具有投资者保护效应,这种保护效应的实现是由于投服中心行权提高了中小股东的行权积极性。(2)区分股东大会类型,发现投服中心参加年度股东大会行权的投资者保护效应更强;区分公司治理特征,发现投服中心行权的投资者保护效应能够弥补内外部治理机制的不足。(3)投服中心行权会对被行权公司的高管联结公司产生溢出效应,并且行权能够产生正向市场反应,表明投服中心行权具有正外部性。研究结果表明,投服中心参加股东大会起到了保护中小投资者利益的作用。

关 键 词:投服中心行权    股东大会    投资者保护    中小股东积极主义    溢出效应
收稿时间:2022-11-08

Investor Protection Effect of ISC Participating in General Meetings
Institution:1.School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China2.Changsha Branch, Agricultural Bank of China, Changsha Hunan 410000, China
Abstract:China Securities Investor Services Center (ISC for short) is an advocate and practitioner of minority shareholder activism, so it is of great research significance and practical value to explore whether ISC exercising contributes to the protection of the interests of minority investors. Based on the exercising data by ISC participating in general meetings from 2017 to 2019, PSM method and DID model were used to analyse the relationship between ISC participating in general meetings and minority shareholder protection. The results showed that: (1) The participation in general meetings of ISC had the investor protection effect, and the realization of this investor protection effect was a result of the fact that ISC exercising encouraged more minority shareholders to exercise their shareholder rights; (2) By distinguishing the types of general meetings, it was found that the investor protection effect of ISC participating in annual general meetings was more significant. By distinguishing the characteristics of corporate governance, it was found that ISC exercising could replace other governance mechanisms to protect minority shareholders’ interests; (3) The participation in general meetings of ISC had a spillover effect on the firms with executives’ ties, and caused significant positive market reaction, showing that ISC exercising had positive externalities. The findings of this study suggest that the participation of ISC in general meetings plays an important role in protecting interests of minority investors.
Keywords:
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