VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS |
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| Authors: | STEPHAN KROLL TODD L. CHERRY JASON F. SHOGREN |
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| Affiliation: | Kroll:;Department of Economics, California State University Sacramento, 6000 J-Street, Sacramento, CA 95819-6082. Phone (916) 920-0797, Fax (916) 278-7062, Email and Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria Cherry:;Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051. Phone (828) 262-6081, Fax: (828) 262-6105, Email: and Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-0550 Shogren:;Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071. Phone (307) 766-5430, Fax: (307) 766-5090, Email: |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. ( JEL C92, D72, H41) |
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