Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World |
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Authors: | Katarina?Nordblom mailto:katarina.nordblom@economics.gu.se%A" title=" katarina.nordblom@economics.gu.se
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Göteborg University, Göteborg, 640, Sweden, SE-405 30 |
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Abstract: | ![]() Different couples are analyzed in presence of income uncertainty and precautionary saving. Married couples have legal restrictions on their relationship that force them to act cooperatively, while cohabitants with limited commitment act non-cooperatively. This makes risk sharing different for different couples; married couples share risk completely, while cohabitants share risk to a lesser extent due to their lack of commitment and cooperation. This makes precautionary savings greater for cohabitants than for married couples. However, cohabitants also tend to undersave to possibly increase assistance from their partner. However, mutual altruism mitigates the inefficiencies and enforces time consistent risk sharing among cohabitants.I am thankful to Jonas Agell, Sophia Grahn-Voorneveld, Peter Kooreman and to Mats Persson for valuable comments on an earlier version. I have also received useful comments from the editor and from two anonymous referees. Generous financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and from Knut and Alice Wallenbergs Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | risk sharing altruism precautionary saving samaritan /content/l741633108537p36/xxlarge8217.gif" alt=" rsquo" align=" BASELINE" BORDER=" 0" >s dilemma limited commitment |
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